British Sociological
Association
Sociology
of Religion Study Group
PROPHETS
AND PREDICTIONS
Religion in the 21st Century
Annual Conference 2000
Wednesday 29th March-Saturday 1st April
at the
University of Exeter
ELISABETH ARWECK
Sociologists
as prophets? The case of new religious movements
If
we accept Popper's assertion that the task of science has a practical
side, namely making predictions and technical application, there
may be an area in the social scientific study of New Religious Movements
which has hitherto not been fully explored. Drawing on Popper's
comments on prediction, the paper will examine the question of whether
it is possible for those who study New Religious Movements to make
predictions about such movements. This question will be examined
in the light of what we know about New Religious Movements since
their emergence in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the way in
which they developed since then, in particular with regard to their
interaction with the modern world. This question will also be examined
in relation to the development of criteria which could serve as
indicators for future developments in New Religious Movements, in
terms of success of failure, survival or decline.
JAMES
BECKFORD
'Choosing
rationality'
Sociologists
of religion have been criticised for clinging too closely to their
theoretical roots in the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Weber. Another
criticism was that they failed to keep pace with theoretical developments
occurring in other fields of sociology. This makes it all the more
surprising and ironic, then, that the controversy which is currently
polarising theoretical opinion among sociologists of religion, at
least in North America and parts of Western Europe, does not arise
from the work of the founding Trinity and is very much part of fashionable
theorising in several social sciences. In other words, Rational
Choice Theory (RCT) ought
to have appealed to critics of the sociology of religion for
eschewing the 'classical' heritage and for echoing the theoretical
concerns of other social scientists. But, as this paper will explain,
certain applications of RCT to the analysis of religion have encountered
extensive resistance and hostility partly because of problematic
aspects of these applications and partly because of excessive rigidity
in the critical responses. The main aim of this paper is to rescue
a place for the notion of rationality in sociological studies of
religion which is neither confined to that of RCT nor eclipsed by
notions of post-modernity.
MALCOLM BROWN
Islam
and the concept of the secular
This
paper is a balanced critique of assertions that Islam is an exception
to theories of secularisation.
This assertion is made on the basis
that the distinction between 'religious' and 'secular' spheres ('God'
and 'Caesar') is specific to Christian theology, and not recognised
in Islam. On the positive side, this model challenges assumptions
which are Eurocentric and evolutionist, which conflate secularisation,
modernisation and the Western route to modernity. On the other hand,
Ibn Khaldun's analysis of 'ummah' and 'asabiyah' can be interpreted
as an Islamic equivalent of the religious-secular dichotomy. This
paper provides theoretical and ethnographic support for the existence
of two competing traditions within Islam, which could be labelled
the theocratic and Khaldunian traditions. Based on the development
of these traditions, my prediction is that they will become increasingly
polarised, and, as a result, increasingly perceived as inimical
alternatives. The theory is taken from Gellner, Mouaqit, Laroui,
Al-Azmeh and others, and the ethnography from my own fieldwork in
the
Lille area of northern France in
1996-97.
STEVE BRUCE
Mainstream
Churches RIP
The
combination of cultural diversity and egalitarianism in the evolution
of modern industrial democracies has made the 'church' form of religion
impossible. The 'sect' form can survive where and to the extent
that the social structure permits the creation of sub-societies.
That leaves the 'denomination' and the 'cult'. Because they have
at their heart an individualistic epistemology, both types are sociologically
precarious.
This paper will concentrate on denominations
in the UK and will argue that their fragility has been masked by
increased life expectancy, and by cohesion that derives from an
identity formed during a sectarian or churchly past and by invested
capital from that past. Both social cohesion and material resources
are wasting assets.
The paper will conclude with very
specific predictions about the disappearance of major British denominations.
HELEN CAMERON
The
decline of the church in England as a local membership organization:
Predicting the nature of civil society in 2050
This paper draws upon my doctoral
research on the local church and my current research into local
membership organisations. These organisations change slowly but
there are indications that as well as declining numerically, the
nature of members' involvement is also changing.
From a review of the literature on
civil society, three forces are suggested as eroding local face-to-face
membership organisations, namely, commodification, co-option and
privatisation. Commodification is leading to para-church organisations
sustained by careful branding and merchandising providing opportunities
for education and leisure. Co-option is leading to campaigning organisations
that require only occasional face-to-face involvement. Privatisation
is creating small informal socially homogeneous groups searching
for a particular spirituality. Along with Putnam, I argue that membership
answered the need for social engagement created by the Industrial
Revolution and that new times will create new forms of social engagement.
Examples are given as to how these
three forces are currently affecting church membership and how their
dynamic will slowly transform our understanding of what it is to
belong to the Church. Pressed for a specific prediction, I would
suggest that by 2050 only one quarter of those describing themselves
as actively involved in the Church will be members of a local church.
NICK CAMPION
The
future of astrology
Popular
astrology - the Sunsign columns of newspapers and magazines - offers
the only widely accessible psychological model, providing most people
with their only opportunity for self-reflection. All other forms
of psychology are available only in hospitals or universities, while
anyone who knows their birth date can instantly work out their zodiacal
type. This paper argues that in the 21st century astrology will
be completely accepted by the overwhelming majority of the UK population
as a vernacular religion which provides believers with a sense of
purpose and enables them to interpret their behaviour. The current
evidence suggests that this will happen regardless of scientific
or religious opposition and will be fuelled by commercial pressures;
astrology sells women's magazines and tabloid newspapers. Astrology
will thus be the first tabloid religion.
The paper examines recent developments
in astrology, the response to modernism in the creation of spiritual
and psychological astrology, the origins and development of newspaper
horoscope columns from 1930 to the present day and the impact of
technology through horoscope phone lines in the 1980s and the world
wide web in the 1990s.
JOSÉ CASANOVA
Beyond
European and American exceptionalisms: Towards a global perspective
In order to move beyond the fruitless
secularization debate between the 'European' and the 'American'
positions we need to adopt a global perspective. Such a perspective
should help to historicize our categories, our theories, and the
stories we tell about religious change. From a global historical
perspective the series of changes we call secularization evince
an internal dynamic unique to a particular form of religious regime,
Western Christendom and its Catholic and Protestant derivates, which
has very few parallels in other world religions, or even in the
oldest and most traditional forms of Christianity, the Eastern Churches.
A global perspective should help as well to relativize the Western
story and to distinguish global
and universal historical processes.
Most importantly, it should help
us deconstruct and disentangle critically and reflexively the story
of Christian secularization and general developmental theories of
religious rationalization and modernization. The story of secularization
is primarily a story of the tensions, conflicts and patterns of
differentiation between religious and worldly regimes.
Throughout the modern age, at least
since the dissolution of Western Christendom and the emergence of
a world system of sovereign territorial states, the transformation
of churches and states and the institutionalized patterns of church-state
relations have served as the determining framework and setting for
differential patterns of secularization. Ongoing processes of globalization
force us to rethink our secularization stories and the criteria
we should use to measure the declining or ascending significance
of religion. At a time when
processes of globalization are leading
to new transformations of worldly and religious regimes and the
Weberian definition of both states and churches as territorial monopolistic
institutions is becoming less and less relevant, it may also be
time to look for evidence of the social significance of religion
in the emerging world order not so much in national settings but
elsewhere: in the reemergence of the transnational dimensions of
religious regimes, in new civilizational and intercivilizational
dynamics, and in the formation of a global civil society.
PAUL CHAMBERS
'A
Very Religious People'? Contemporary processes of religious decline
in Wales and their implications for the maintenance of a distinctive
Welsh cultural identity
Traditionally,
the Welsh have been perceived as 'wedded to the chapel', and Nonconformity
has been seen as a key component of Welsh cultural and 'national'
identity. Religious practice in Wales is now declining at a faster
rate than anywhere else in the UK, and this raises significant questions
about the survival of any distinctively Welsh cultural and social
identity, which is not predicated on religion.
This paper seeks to account both
for the rise of Nonconformism as a significant force in Welsh life
and its subsequent decline. It begins with a discussion of the rise
of Nonconformity, drawing from Benedict Anderson's 'imagine communities'
thesis and the role of print-capitalism in the creation of 'national'
identities. It then examines the rise of a distinctive, solidaristic
Welsh working class culture and collective community structure,
centred on the role of the chapel as a 'moral property … the very
emblem of the community's collective existence'. Drawing from data
collected during fieldwork in Swansea it examines the place of the
chapel in the local community life in the early part of this century,
outlining its social, economic and cultural functions. The role
of the 1904 Revival, the watershed of mass religious practice in
Wales, is briefly examined and the argument advanced that this phenomenon
was more to do with debates about national identity and the language
question rather than purely religious maters. The subsequent decline
of traditional community structures in Wales is then outlined and,
again drawing from data generated in Swansea, the effects on religious
life of both, the Depression and subsequent post-war affluence and
social mobility are examined.
No firm conclusions are drawn as
to the likely markers of Welsh identity in the 21st
Century - post-Christianum
- but a question is raised qua
Durkheim, as to how we might begin to imagine a 'religionless'
Welsh national identity.
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